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ABSTRACT
My job in this thesis is to explore a supposedly dragon-filled area of philosophy, 
tropology. By 'tropology,' I only mean the study of figurative speech, or, more 
particularly, metaphors. It seems clear to most people that metaphors have meaning. But 
this fact flies in the face of several different theories of meaning. For example, the 
meaning of a metaphor can't be properly conveyed by Possible Worlds Semantics or 
Truth-Conditional Semantics. Tropology is also an area of philosophy with very few 
commonly accepted theories. It is not like the study of reference, where there are two 
theories, each having a large following. The various theories in tropology are so radically 
different, with each having relatively few followers, that the it is widely unexplored in 
philosophy. Some theories claim that  metaphors are the exact same as another use of 
speech (namely, similes). Another claims that metaphors lack “meaning.” And a third 
claims that metaphors do 'mean' but getting at that meaning requires some special mental 
operations. By the end of this thesis, you will not only have my map of tropology, my 
theory of metaphors, but also some experimental philosophy about them to help put to 
rest some theories.
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Chapter 1: An Introduction to Tropology
There are many ways of drawing a map. Cartographers of antiquity in areas which
are unknown and dangerous would sometimes write “Hic Sunt Dracones” or, in English, 
“Here Are Dragons.”1 This was to warn wayward adventurers, sailors, and merchants that
these areas are uncharted and thereby dangerous. It is reasonable to assume that users of 
such maps would avoid such areas; sticking instead to known, safe shores and not 
venturing far into the wild blue yonder. Some armchair cartographers may seek to map 
these partially undiscovered countries through reports from survivors from lost voyages, 
induction, and, perhaps deduction. The maps produced by these cartographers may be 
more accurate than others. Some may represent a placid island where there is none; have 
two landmasses connected, when there is, in fact, a great sea separating them; or, perhaps 
just as erroneous, have a great sea between two connected masses. 
The metaphor tying this passage above to the topic of this paper is that philosophy
is cartography. I find this metaphor to be extremely rich in many different regards. First, 
built into this metaphor is the further that philosophic theories are maps. If a map charts 
something as there which is not, or fails to chart something which is there, that map is not
as good as one which does not have these failings.  Philosophical theories which claim 
something as true which is not, claims that something is false which is true, or simply 
does not account for something; then that theory would be just as good as a faulty map. It
is sort of hard to picture this, but a map which posits something both there and not there 
would be a bad map for that region. In the same way, a philosophical theory which brings
with it a contradiction would be an equally bad theory for the area in question.  Built into 
1 Sometimes translated as “Here Be Dragons.”
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that is the idea that there are many ways of drawing a map. Two philosophers, trying to 
explain the same phenomenon, may come up with radically different theories. Second, we
have the notion of 'Hic Sunt Dracones.' People using an incomplete map, as I mentioned 
not moments before, would avoid the unknown, remain in the safe areas. Philosophers are
much the same way. We each have our own map, composed of the various theories that 
we endorse. These maps, I am willing to wager for many philosophers, will have areas 
which are marked as dangerous, the unknown. It is reasonable as well, to assume that 
many philosophers stick with the known, familiar shores on their maps. Philosophers of 
some field (or fields) rarely venture into the area of dragons. We are insular in that regard.
The criticism of a map from a person who does not inhabit the area, who has not explored
it, is far less powerful than such from a person who does or has. 
My job in this thesis is to give a map of an area in which dragons are said to 
reside, tropology. By 'tropology,' I do not mean the sometimes commonplace meaning 'a 
metaphoric interpretation of the bible or some other sacred text' but rather I mean the 
study of figurative speech, or figurative speech (more particularly, metaphors) simpliciter.
The notion of metaphors for many philosophers, flies in the face of their theories of 
meaning.2 Tropology is also an area of philosophy with very few commonly accepted 
maps, and these maps are radically different from each other; some claim that the area of 
metaphors is just another name for another area,3 another claims that the region lacks the 
feature of meaning,4 another group claims that the region has the meaning-feature and has
special mental operations to understand.5 
2 For example, Donald Davidson, who we will see later.
3 The Similes Account
4 Non-Cognativist Account
5 My Account and The Interaction Account
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After this chapter, I have three more. The first (chapter 2) gives a brief overview 
of some of the more common maps used for tropology as well as my own. The first ( 1), 
concerns the theory of metaphors expounded by Aristotle and Quintilian. This, stated 
briefly, is that metaphors are abbreviated similes. The second ( 2) concerns the Interaction
Account of Metaphors which is that metaphors involve the interaction of two concepts, 
with one emphasizing features of the other.  The third ( 3) concerns the Non-cognitivist 
accounts of metaphors. These are, stated simply, that metaphors don't mean, but rather do 
something else. The fourth and final theory we will discuss is my own. I do not want to 
give many spoilers, but I will also be covering what my theory of metaphors can do and 
explain, such as why some might find others offensive and how a person could learn 
something from a metaphor. The third chapter of this thesis concerns my metaphoric 
traveling to the land of metaphors and an experimental philosophy study that I conducted 
(making me less of an armchair cartographer). The first section is a basic introduction, 
where I state that this was to test whether Aristotle's theory was in fact correct. The 
second is an outlining of my two hypotheses. These were that metaphors are not 
abbreviated similes and that metaphors will receive responses concerning appearance 
more oft than similes. In the third section, I will cover the procedure that I used to collect 
the data. In the fourth, I give the results of the study. The final section is a discussion of 
the results and some interesting finds, showing the need for further testing or recoding 
(only in the case of some of the results). The final chapter is relatively short just as a 
conclusion to this thesis.    
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Chapter 2: Different Theories of Metaphor
 1. Comparison (Simile) Theories of metaphors
There is a theory about metaphors which claims that they are nothing more than 
abbreviated similes. As we will see later on, I performed an experimental philosophy 
study testing whether this was the case; but first, it would be good to go over the different
philosophers who have claimed something along these lines.
 1.1 Aristotle 
First on the docket is Aristotle. In The Rhetoric, Aristotle starts off by claiming 
that metaphors are in bad taste, as can be seen in the following quote:6 
There remains the fourth region in which bad taste may be shown, metaphor. 
Metaphors like other things may be inappropriate. Some are so because they are 
ridiculous; they are indeed used by comic as well as tragic poets. Others are too 
grand and theatrical; and these, if they are far-fetched, may also be obscure. For 
instance, Gorgias talks of 'events that are green and full of sap', and says 'foul was 
the deed you sowed and evil the harvest you reaped'. That is too much like poetry. 
Alcidamas, again, called philosophy 'a fortress that threatens the power of law', 
and the Odyssey 'a goodly looking-glass of human life',' talked about 'offering no 
such toy to poetry': all these expressions fail, for the reasons given, to carry the 
hearer with them. The address of Gorgias to the swallow, when she had let her 
droppings fall on him as she flew overhead, is in the best tragic manner. He said, 
'Nay, shame, O Philomela'. Considering her as a bird, you could not call her act 
shameful; considering her as a girl, you could; and so it was a good gibe to 
6 Aristotle, Rhetoric 3 iii
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address her as what she was once and not as what she is.
It is ironic, therefore, that the translators chose to use the term “bad taste” in this section, 
because it seems clear that that is used metaphorically. This passage does have some gold
to it, we see that one can easily make out of it a system of degrees between good and bad 
metaphors. We have the latter when, to follow Aristotle, the metaphors are too much akin 
to poetry; they are too obscure for the listener to follow. Good metaphors, on the other 
hand, may be those which the listener has no trouble following. Good metaphors are 
those which are not too obscure or akin to poetry. 
Tying this back to the notion that metaphors are abbreviated similes, we need to 
look at the next section of Aristotle's Rhetoric. Aristotle's main thrust is made with the 
following quote:
The Simile also is a metaphor; the difference is but slight. When the poet says of 
Achilles that he "[l]eapt on the foe as a lion," this is a simile; when he says of him 
'the lion leapt', it is a metaphor-here, since both are courageous, he has transferred 
to Achilles the name of 'lion'. Similes are useful in prose as well as in verse; but 
not often, since they are of the nature of poetry. They are to be employed just as 
metaphors are employed, since they are really the same thing except for the 
difference mentioned. 7
The difference that Aristotle seems to have mentioned is the use of the word “as” or 
“like.” “He leapt as a lion” is a metaphor because of the comparison of the action of 
Achilles and that which a lion may do; whereas “the lion leapt” is a metaphor because it 
lacks the comparison indicators. 
7 Aristotle, Rhetoric 3 vi
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I found it interesting, and thereby found a little more gold, in Aristotle claiming 
that it was the name (maybe solely) which was transferred to Achilles. When I give my 
account of metaphors, the Cicero-Austinian Account, the notion of 'transferal' will play a 
central role, but I don't think it was the name which was transferred alone, nor do I think 
that referring to a thing by a different name is the sole way metaphors are used; as are in 
Aristotle's examples.
Aristotle also states, in chapter 2 of Rhetoric, that metaphors, for prose-writers, 
are very important. He says:
In the Art of Poetry, as we have already said, will be found definitions of these 
kinds of words; a classification of Metaphors; and mention of the fact that 
metaphor is of great value both in poetry and in prose. Prose-writers must, 
however, pay specially careful attention to metaphor, because their other resources
are scantier than those of poets. Metaphor, moreover, gives style clearness, charm,
and distinction as nothing else can: and it is not a thing whose use can be taught 
by one man to another. Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which means that
they must fairly correspond to the thing signified: failing this, their 
inappropriateness will be conspicuous: the want of harmony between two things is
emphasized by their being placed side by side.8 
This makes metaphors seem more important than similes, but the core notion that,
on the whole, they are the same. He warns that a prose-writer must be careful when it 
comes to metaphors because they are, he thinks, overly poetic in comparison to similes. It
is worth noting that Aristotle thinks that metaphors must be fitting to the object. For 
8 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 3, ii
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example, just as we can't say “the sun is like an automobile,” it is equally unfitting to say 
“the sun is an automobile.”    
 1.2 Quintilian 
Next up is Quintilian. In Institutio Oritoria, he writes that metaphors are merely 
shortened similes (or merely shorter similes), as can be seen in the following passage: 
It is even possible to express facts of a somewhat unseemly character by a 
judicious use of metaphor, as in the following passage:
“This do they lest too much indulgence make
The field of generation slothful grow
And choke its idle furrows.”
On the whole metaphor is a shorter form of simile, while there is this further 
difference, that in the latter we compare some object to the thing which we wish 
to describe, whereas in the former this object is actually substituted for the thing.9
The main difference between this view and Aristotle's is that, while Aristotle took 
similes to be a form of metaphor, Quintilian takes it to be the case that metaphors are a 
form of similes. Aside from this, which could simply be seen as a difference in name for 
the same categories, the views on metaphors are basically the same. Both are claiming 
that they are abbreviated similes, with one making a comparison by referring to an object 
by a different name, while the other is explicitly making a comparison. 
Other comparison (simile) theories of metaphors follow a very  similar idea to the 
one found in these two philosophers. My main objection to the theory will be covered 
later on in my analysis of an experimental philosophy study that I conducted. 
9 Quint. Inst. 8 6.8  
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 2. Interaction Theories of Metaphors
The Interaction Theory of Metaphors comes from Max Black and others. We will 
start our look into this view of metaphors by looking at this quote from I.A. Richards:
In the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of 
different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose 
meaning is resultant from their interaction.10
From this quote, Black in his book “Models and Metaphors” builds a rather robust theory 
of how metaphors function and work (some of which will be implemented in my own 
theory later on).
The core feature which Black need to make this idea work is that words have a 
system of associated commonplaces.11 The system of associated commonplaces for some 
thing, according to Black, is approximately the set of statements resulting from asking a 
layman about what he or she held to be true about the thing in question. These responses 
are not necessarily actually the case; one could easily imagine that a person whose culture
has it that rainbows are a sign of good fortune from the gods would give that as one of 
their responses. Also, using the same example, the system of commonplaces will, 
probably, be different from culture to culture. A member of this rainbow-culture would 
have a different system for rainbows than would a member of my own (whatever culture 
that may be). The idea that these commonplaces are different from culture to culture can 
be supported by the almost obvious observation that metaphors rarely can be translated 
from one language to another. For example, take the Latin metaphor “relinquare nuces,” 
10 Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, pg. 93
11 Black, pg. 40
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which translates as “to relinquish/give-up the nuts.” The vast majority of people, 
including the readers of this thesis, would not understand the meaning of this metaphor; 
or, if they tried to give a meaning, it would more than likely be way off base. The 
meaning of the phrase in Latin is “to grow up” and the reasoning for this, to follow 
Black, is that in Roman culture, nuts were used as childhood playthings (like dice). So, in
the system of commonplaces for nut, the Romans had “is a childhood plaything,” which 
is not included in most other systems for these objects in other cultures. 
The way metaphors work, then, for Black, can be seen in the following passage, 
where he is talking about the metaphor “man is a wolf” (which he uses often as an 
example here):
The effect, then, of (metaphorically) calling a man a "wolf " is to evoke the wolf-
system of related commonplaces. If the man is a wolf, he preys upon other 
animals, is fierce, hungry, engaged in constant struggle, a scavenger, and so on. 
Each of these implied assertions has now to be made to fit the principal subject 
(the man) either in normal or in abnormal senses. If the metaphor is at all 
appropriate, this can be done-up to a point at least. A suitable hearer will be led by
the wolf-system of implications to construct a corresponding system of 
implications about the principal subject. But these implications will not be those 
comprised in the commonplaces normally implied by literal uses of “man”. The 
new implications must be determined by the pattern of implications associated 
with literal uses of the word "wolf". Any human traits that can without undue 
strain be talked about in "wolf-language" will be rendered prominent, and any that
9
cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some 
details, emphasizes others-in short, organizes our view of man. 
Let us apply this general idea to a simple case. Say the metaphor is “she is a 
rainbow;” what would be the system of commonplaces for rainbow in our culture? I can 
see certain things like “is colorful,” “comes after rain,” “is homosexual,”12 “is arched,” 
“is flamboyant,” and so on. For Black, then, the hearer of the metaphor would have this 
system in place and make the implications fit the primary subject, “she” in this case. The 
traits of the person in question which can be stated using the rainbow-system will become
more pronounced, whereas the others will be quenched down. 
The main issue that I have with this account, taken at face value, is that it would 
have a very hard time accounting for how a person could learn something from a 
metaphor. As Black explicitly states in the passage cited above “[t]he wolf-metaphor 
suppresses some details, emphasizes others-in short, organizes our view of man;” This 
means that all of the information about man is already within the system of associated 
commonplaces, and the framing or presenting of man as a wolf only increases or makes 
more prominent the relevant parts of the commonplaces. Features are not added to the 
system, but rather are emphasized.  
If we say that learning amounts to (or, at least, sometimes is) the addition of 
information to a system like Black's associated commonplaces, then it would not be 
possible to learn from a metaphor; because no information is added to the system. 
Suppose that I and another person we talking about a person who I had not met 
12 This would be there because of the common use of the rainbow color scheme for homosexual rights 
purposes.
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previously. My cohort may very well seek to enlighten me to some of the person's 
personality by describing her as a rainbow. It seems clear to me that if I had the 
appropriate system of commonplaces for rainbows in mind, I would have learned 
something from the metaphor (because I added some information about the person). 
Since I had very little information about this person before hand, it is hard to say that any 
features were emphasized or subdued. Rather, it seems more appropriate to say that 
features were transferred or carried over from the vehicle (the object of the metaphor) to 
the primary subject.   
 3. Non-cognitivist Theories
A non-cognitivist about metaphors would say that metaphors are devoid of 
meaning outside of the literal content of the words. They deny the seemingly plausible 
view held by myself and many others that metaphors have meaning in a substantive 
sense. Despite this, they do claim that metaphors are effective in what they do, but they 
don't do it by meaning anything. Donald Davidson being the primary promoter of this 
view, holds, rather counter-intuitively, that metaphors mean nothing over and above the 
literal meaning of the sentence. On his view, metaphors make “us attend to some 
likeness, often a novel or surprising likeness, between two or more things.”13 This is 
done, according to Davidson, by “making us see one thing as another.”14 
A fantastic objection to this account, and one that I had not previously thought of 
(the one I had in mind was far longer and subtle), is outlined by Marga Reimer and 
Elisabeth Camp in their overview of metaphors, who cite others as the originators.15 The 
13 Davidson, 33
14 Ibid  47
15 Reimer, pg. 858
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objection requires us to understand what 'dead metaphors' are, as opposed to 'novel 
metaphors.' Dead metaphors are those such that they have been so frequently used that 
they have some new literal  meaning. Think of the metaphor “kicked the bucket.” In that 
case, it seems clear that it means 'died' or 'is dead' in a more veiled way. This does not 
require any special mental operations to understand whereas novel metaphors more than 
likely will.16  The core notion behind the non-cognitivist account of metaphors is that they
do not mean, but that they do something other. Since in order to have dead metaphors, 
like 'kicked the bucket', we needed to have used the metaphor to mean something enough 
to have that meaning engrained as literal, metaphors must mean something, which rejects 
non-cognitivism.
 4. Cicero-Austinian Account of Metaphors (My Account)
After much build up, this is my account of metaphors. As its name, Cicero-
Austinian, suggests, this idea comes  primarily from the works of the Roman orator and 
philosopher Cicero and the philosopher J.L. Austin. But I am also incorporating some 
contemporary works in philosophy of language and mind, more particularly, the idea of 
mental files. I will be treating this section a little different than I have the previous 
explanations of theories of metaphors, mostly because it is my own baby; but also 
because, rather than merely explaining the view of another, I am culminating several 
other views into one cohesive whole. I will start by going over the relevant parts of 
Cicero, then move on to Austin, and then to Recanati (for the mental files work). After 
this, I will move on to show how these various parts link up. 
16 This is a claim that they make and I am of a mind to argue against it, but it does not hurt nor help the 
objection.
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 4.1 Cicero 
The following passage comes from Cicero's work “De Oratore.” In full honesty, 
there are a few similarities between his view and Aristotle's, but the markable differences 
make his view more pleasing to my eyes:17
Thus, in a simple word, there are three qualities which an orator can bring in to 
illustrate and beautify his speech: these are either an unusual word, new word, or 
carried over word. [...] The third way, that of carrying words over, extends widely.
Necessity gave birth to this third way, forced by how limited and narrow language
was. But, after that, pleasure and delight make it frequently used. For it is like 
how we first started wearing clothes to repel the cold, but we later made them 
ornaments of the body and a sign of dignity; thus, the carrying-over of words had 
been made a custom, with need being the cause and frequency being the pleasure. 
[...] For when a statement scarcely can be said truly with a proper word, it is said 
with a carried over word. The statement, which we want to be understood, with 
similarity, brings light to its thing, which we put with a foreign word. Thus, these 
'carrying-overs' are like 'borrowings,' when that which you don't have you can get 
is from somewhere else. Those things are a little more bold and don't indicate 
need, but bring something of brilliance to a speech; what should I put to you of 
their kinds and reasons from invention? 
Normally when this passage is translated, people will translate “verba translata” as 
“metaphors.” I chose to go with a more literal translation (translating the phrase as 
17 This is my translation. I am working form Cicero, 152 
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“carried over words”18) because I feel that it better grasps how Cicero thought about these
things.
According to Cicero (breaking down the passage),  early on in a language's 
development, it was limited in what it could express and the contexts in which it could be
used properly. But there was a need to express oneself in new contexts. So, people began 
to borrow words from different contexts and apply them in these new scenarios. As time 
went on, however, new words were added to the lexicon, making the need to borrow 
words in this way less and less. But we kept the habit of carrying words over because 
they either add beauty to one's statements or they express something which would be 
difficult or impossible to say with the words appropriate for the context. This is similar to
why we started wearing clothes. Initially, it was to keep us warm and to make sure that 
we stayed dry. But, as we, as a society developed, the need for clothes became less and 
less. We have kept clothes around mostly to show dignity and custom. 
In this passage also, we see the similarity to Aristotle's account. Both involve a 
notion of transferal, which has, uncoincidentally,  a similar etymology to the word 
“metaphor.” For Aristotle, it was a word carried over to a thing other than its proper 
referent. But for Cicero, it is a word carried over from one context to another. 
 4.2 Austin
The next portion of my theory of metaphors comes, as I noted above, from the 
works of J.L. Austin; more particularly, it comes from his paper “On the Meaning of a 
Word.” The part relevant to this project concerns the primary, or nuclear, sense of a word:
18 The term 'verba translata' literally translates as 'carried over words,' The perfect participle of 'transfero' 
(I carry over) is 'translatus, a, um,' with 'verba' being the plural of the word 'verbum'
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A very simple case indeed is one often mentioned by Aristotle: the adjective 
'healthy': when I talk of a healthy body and again of a healthy complexion, of 
healthy exercise: the word is not being used just 'equivocally'. Aristotle would say 
that it is being used 'paronymously'. In this case there is what we may call a 
primary nuclear sense of 'healthy': the sense in which 'healthy' is used of a healthy
body: I call this nuclear because it is 'contained as a part' in the other two senses, 
which may be set out as 'productive of healthy bodies' and 'resulting from healthy 
bodies'.19
To illustrate how one could learn the primary, or nuclear, sense of a word, let's try 
it with another word (aside from 'healthy'), 'soft.' Take a look at these three statements:
1. The grass is soft 
2. He is a soft grader 
3. The lighting is soft.
These are all fairly common phrases which people use to describe the world around them.
According to Austin, these three uses of the word should have some feature in common. 
I think that the meaning of (1) is that the grass is not firm or is easily malleable to 
your body shape.20 Some examples of this way of thinking about it are 'a soft bed,' 'a soft 
pillow,' and 'a soft breeze.' The other two have similar connotations to them about this. 
For (2), I would say that the grader is not firm about his expectation, is malleable to 
different standards. With just these first two examples we can sort of see a trend; thus far, 
the meaning of 'soft' is (easily) malleable. This holds true for the third statement. (3) 
19 Austin, 55-75 
20 Think of lying in a meadow. 
15
means that the lighting bends around objects, that it does not cast hard shadows behind 
them.21 
In all three of these cases, the meaning of 'soft' is malleable. Another, probably 
more robust, example can be seen when we look at our use of the word 'hard.' Take a look
at these three statement uses of the word: 
4. A hard rock 
5. A hard problem 
6. A hard line 
It would seem that the meanings of each  have something in common. 
For (4), it is quick and easy to say that they meaning is that the rock in question is 
4+) not easily broken, firm, or solid. This same type of meaning can be seen in the 
phrases “a hard wall of snow,” “a hard bed,” and “a hard block of wood.” Each of these 
don't deviate much from that core meaning. All three of them are firm, solid, or not easily
broken.
With my second case, we can say that the meaning of (5) is that the problem in 
question is 5+) not easily solved.22 This general sense of “not easily X-ed” can be seen in 
the phrases “a hard book23,” “a hard project24,” and “a hard speech.25” In each of these, the
X is in some way related to break. One breaks down a book in order to read it.26 One 
breaks down a project into steps in order to complete it. And one breaks down a speech 
21 Like what one would see in a surrealist painting.
22 One may also see similarities between 'solving' and 'breaking.' 
23 Not easily read. 
24 Not easily completed.
25 Not easily memorized/given.
26 This is clearer when regarding a sentence, one breaks down a sentence in order to read it.
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into parts in order to memorize and give it.  
With the final example, I am quick to say that the meaning of (6) would seem to 
be that it is a line between two things is 6+) not easily crossed or we would say that is is 
firm in how it divides the two things. We commonly say that we break a line when it is 
we cross it. This idea of being firm in how it does something can be seen in the phrases 
“a hard word,” “a hard sailor,” and “a hard law.”  
All of these, (4+)-(6+), have one or more things in common. Each of them involve
something not easily done, and many of them involve firmness or  solidity.  Thus, the 
primary sense of the word 'hard,' for Austin, would be the sense which we mean when we
say the phrase 'a hard rock.' The different senses of the word 'hard' are derived from this 
primary sense because each of them have some aspect of the sense.  So, the primary sense
of a word, for Austin, is the aspect of the sense of a word in all of its various uses.27
 4.3 Mental Files
As I said in the onset of this project, the next feature of my theory of metaphors 
comes from contemporary works in philosophy of mind and language. These works 
concern the notion of mental files, which is explained by Recanati as follows:
The role of the files is to store information about the objects we bear these 
acquaintance relations to. So mental files are 'about objects' : like singular terms 
in the language, they refer, or are supposed to refer. They are, indeed, the mental 
counterparts of singular terms. What they refer to is not determined by properties 
which the subject takes the referent to have (i.e. by information — or 
27 The idea of a 'primary sense' will be amended after I have mental files (more particularly, generic files) 
in my toolbox (in section 4.1). But this is how Austin thought about it, it is workable for now, and it sets
us on the right track. 
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misinformation — in the file), but through the relations on which the files are 
based. The reference is the entity we are acquainted with (in the appropriate way),
not the entity which best 'fits' information in the file. 28
I have the mental file about the computer screen before me, call it 'Old and Busted.' The 
file about Old and Busted exists in virtue of the epistemically rewarding relation (the 
relation allows me to gain information about it) I have with it (I can see it) and contained 
in that file are the predicates 'is missing two bolts,' 'has twelve cracks in the glass 
covering,' 'has a back panel which is falling off,' 'is falling apart (quite literally),' and 'was
once a touch screen but is no longer.'
These files, like words, refer to the objects which they are about. The deal is, 
though, that built into the picture is an anti-descriptivist backdrop.  It should be clear that 
the mental files refer to objects, not in virtue of their content but rather in virtue of their 
ER relation (the epistemically rewarding relation that they have with the object in 
question). This avoids many of the purported problems with descriptivism and its 
variations; such as the Twin Earth Case.29 
With the Twin Earth Case, the conclusion from Putnam was that “meaning just 
ain't in the head.”30 But if mental files are mind-dependent, and they refer to some 
object(s), then we can say that the meaning of the words is not wholly in the head, but 
rather is partially in the head and partially not. Mental files, as I have mentioned, refer to 
objects in virtue of the ER relation.  Relations between objects aren't wholly in one place 
or another. If we were forced to pinpoint where the relation is, people would be totally 
28 Ibid pg, 35
29 Ibid pg. 121
30 Putnam,227 
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lost. For example, take the “x is a brother of y” relation. It seems to me that the relation is
not only where x is located, nor is it only where y  is. For this relation to hold, both of the
objects need to exist.31 This is because relations exist where the related things are; they 
are bi-, tri-, or even quadrilocated.32 Playing off of Putnam's statement, we can say that 
“meaning ain't just in the head.” 
One could go with a Meinongian account of the existence of relations, to which I 
am sympathetic, and state that relations do not exist, but rather they subsist.33 Subsisting 
things do not have a location, definite or otherwise, so asking where a relation is located 
is close to a category error. This is amicable to the relation between mental files and their 
objects because we can say that the relation holds in virtue of both the object and the 
mental file existing,34 though the relation itself does not exist.  
Now that we have a base level understanding of mental files, I would like to move
now to a suppler and more nuanced version, which I call 'Generic Files.'
 4.3.1 Generic Files
In order to really have my account of metaphors flourish, I need a more general 
31 In the case where one of the relata ceases to exist, we specify a time for, or temporally index the 
relation, such as “x was the brother of y” or, if we do not specify y, we say “x had a brother.”
32 An example of that last one could be the give relation when the giver, w, is giving a present to three 
others. “w gives a television to x, y, and z.” 
33 Meinong writes in The Theory of Objects “the totality of what exists,including what has existed and 
will exist, is infinitely small in comparison with the totality of the Objects of knowledge. This fact 
easily goes unnoticed, probably because the lively interest in reality which is part of our nature tends to 
favor that exaggeration which finds the non-real a mere nothing--or, more precisely, which finds the 
non-real to be something for which science has no application at all or at least no application of any 
worth. How little truth there is in such a view is most easily shown by ideal Objects which do indeed 
subsist (bestehen), but which do not by any means exist (existieren), and consequently cannot in any 
sense be real (wirklich). Similarity and difference are examples of objects of this type: perhaps, under 
certain circumstances, they subsist between realities; but they are not a part of reality themselves.” (pg. 
79) This explicitly states that relations between objects are not parts of reality (existing) but rather that 
they subsist. Despite this, Meinong contends that we can still make true statements about these objects. 
34 If it is appropriate to say that mind-dependent objects exist. We could say that the relation holds in 
virtue of the object existing and the person in question has the mental file. 
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version of mental files. You can have a mental file for a particular cat, but you cannot 
have one for cats in general. As cited by Recanati, Kenneth Taylor in his book “Reference
and the Rational Mind” writes that:
A conception... is a kind of mental particular, a labeled, perhaps highly structured, 
and updateable database of information about the extension of an associated 
concept. For example, each thinker who can deploy the concept <cat> in thought 
episodes is likely to have stored in his head a database of information (and 
misinformation) about cats.35
Though  Recanati states that Taylor seems to be talking about mental files, he still claims 
that Taylor's 'conception' corresponds with the content of a file (the predicates, 
information, or misinformation in the file).36 My question here is “why can't we have it 
both ways?” Why can't we have a sort of generic file which contains information about a 
class of objects?
Well, it seems that we can. The mental files framework is perfectly amicable with 
the idea that we can have files for classes of objects. I would call such files 'generic files,'
but Recanati calls them 'recognitional files.'37  Recanati writes that: 
It is tempting — though not mandatory — to construe natural-kind concepts as 
recognitional files, distinguished from the above by the fact that their content is 
not an individual object. We use the superficial or 'stereotypical' properties of 
water to detect water in the environment. What we detect is that substance (H20) 
multiple exposure to which has created and maintained in us the disposition to 
35 Taylor, 181 
36 Recanati, 38
37 Recanati, 72
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recognize it. In a different environment a different substance would possibly play 
the same role: it would have the same superficial characteristics and multiple 
exposure to it would have created and maintained in us the same disposition to 
recognize it via those characteristics. In such a context we would have a concept 
very similar to our WATER-concept and internally indistinguishable from it, but it
would not be a concept of water. It would be a concept of twater or XYZ 
(however we call the substance which plays the role of water on Twin-Earth). On 
this familiar, Putnamian picture, the reference of our WATER-concept depends 
upon the context, even if the context at issue is much broader than the context 
relevant to determining the reference of HERE.38 
These generic files would be much like what Taylor calls 'conceptions' in the passage 
above. The ER relation for this type of file is not connected to a singular entity, like my 
mental file for my grandmother Smith, but rather it is connected to a class of objects 
through my ability to recognize the thing. For example, as I was pulling into my 
driveway, a gray furry creature bolted across my front lights. I was able to recognize that 
creature as a bunny. My  BUNNY file is based upon my disposition to recognize or my 
ability to label objects correctly of this general type.   
In these generic files is the stereotypical information about some thing. Such as, in
the WATER file is 'H2O' and in the CAT file is 'mammal.' A claim which I would like to 
make, though nothing really hinges on it for this thesis, is that the information (or 
misinformation) contained in  mental files makes reference to generic files. So, using 
more symbolic language, if mental file X contains the predicate 'is Y' where Y is a 
38 Ibid, pg.72
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generic, then X refers to Y in the same sort of way as the mental file X refers to its object.
When we make the statement 'X is Y,' it is not the case that all of the (mis)information 
contained in the Y file is called to mind, but it does contain all of such information.
Having this referring relation between mental files lessens the amount of space 
required to contain all of the information I have about a subject. Suppose that I have a 
SNOW file39  for my pet cat. Contained in the SNOW file would be the predicate 'is a 
cat.' Without these relations, in addition to that predicate, there would be the predicates 
“is a mammal,” “is warm-blooded,” “is four-legged,” “has pointy ears,” and so on. And 
these bits of information (or misinformation) would be had in all files about individual 
cats, which seems remarkably redundant.
With this relation between mental files, the predicate 'is a cat' would make 
reference to the generic file CAT. All of the seemingly redundant predicates are in the 
CAT file, and this is true for all mental files about individual cats.  From this reference or 
through this link,  if a person were to ask me “is Snow a mammal?” I could easily make 
the assertions that Snow is a mammal, because she is a cat. I could also assert that she has
any other predicate contained in the CAT file; such as that Snow is fluffy, that Snow likes
to knock over stacks of paper etc. But calling up all of that information is not necessary to
assert that Snow is a cat.40 In much the same way as how calling a mental file to mind 
does not force the thinker to think about every bit of information (or misinformation) 
contained therein, calling to mind a generic file does not force the thinker to think about 
every bit of information contained in it.  
39 'Snow' being the name of my cat.
40 Just like how, according to the mental files picture, reference is not determined by the content of the 
file. I could be totally wrong about cats, but I could still refer to them an assert that Snow is one.
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Another example of how my idea of the relation between predicates and these 
generic files works is in the way we make judgments about things. It is a perfectly real 
possibility that I could have been unsure about whether the gray furry startled creature 
zooming in front of my headlamps was a bunny. But after getting a good long look at it, I 
noticed certain salient properties. In the case of bunnies, these salient properties are a 
general shape and a general color. In virtue of seeing those features arranged as they 
were, I automatically asserted, to myself, at the very least, that the creature before me 
was a bunny. Now, what predicates are contained in the generic file BUNNY?  Some of 
these  predicates would be the color or the general shape.41 Others would be clearly 
referring to other files. Such as the MAMMAL file. The MAMMAL file would contain 
further information, such as 'is warm blooded.' I am not a biologist so the WARM 
BLOODED file does not contain all that much information but other files, like FURRY, 
would contain even more references to other files..  
The various predicates in the generic file, one can easily see, are basically what 
Black had as the elements in his system of associated commonplaces and what Austin had
in mind for his senses.  From this, I think that the elements in the generic file for some 
thing(s) are the same as the elements in the purported system of associated 
commonplaces. 
One potential worry for this picture is that many, but not all (most), predicates 
would be relational. I have no problem with this and, in fact, I have been mulling this 
idea around in my mind for a long time. The core of this idea can be found in Logic, 
though I think it is backwards. The basic idea is that predication is a relation between an 
41 Maybe we could describe the general shape of the rabbit. 
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object and a set. The nature of this relation would be slightly different, as it is the relation
between two mental files but the idea that predication, at its heart, is (most of the time) 
relational is still there. 
There is another potential worry that claiming that the contents of mental files 
make reference to generic files and they too have contents (and are themselves mental 
files), that it would be mental files all the way down.42 Or, in more literal language, we 
have an infinite-regress problem; file A refers to file B which refers to file C and so on.  
To avoid this issue, we should claim that there are certain base level, or bedrock generic 
files which cannot be explained in terms of other files, where all of the information in 
them does not have any further explanation. The files for some colors could be an 
example of this.43 This is not to say that mental files define; they just contain information 
about the subject. But just to reiterate, this is not necessary for my claims here, all I need 
are the first level generic files (like WATER or CAT) to get my connections to metaphors 
off the ground. But, as we will see later on, having even more connections makes the 
explanation of offensive metaphors even clearer than otherwise.  
 4.4 The Way My Theory Works
Thus far, we have three different concepts. One, Austin's, concerned the meaning 
42 This is a variation on the common metaphor in philosophy “it is turtles all the way down.”
43 Though we can use color files metaphorically, but only when there is further information contained in 
the file beyond the phenomenological experience of the shade. For example, I was listening to a 
purported heavy metal cover of Mr. Sandman originally by The Chordettes; a friend of mine said that 
“the vocals are a bit white.” The WHITE file contains more than just the phenomenological experience 
of white, or a memory thereof, but also that it is the opposite of black, and the BLACK file in turn has a 
strong connection to heavy metal music. These can be used metaphorically, but only because there is 
more to them than the most bedrock aspects. Think of what metaphoric meaning there could be for the 
statement “she is chartreuse.” I can't think of one, because there is nothing else to that file other than the
color.
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of a word. This was that it is the primary sense; such as the primary sense of the word 
'soft' is easily malleable. The second, Cicero's, was concerning how metaphors function. 
This was that words are carried over from some context to another. Our third concept is 
that of mental files. Bringing these three ideas together, we can say that a Cicero-
Austinian account of what metaphors are is:
Metaphors are statements where one or more of the words have some aspects (or a
single aspect) of their primary senses are carried over.
The notion of carrying-over is where I need to apply more advanced philosophical jargon 
and use the notion of mental files:
Carrying-over is the process by which some predicates are copied, borrowed, or 
moved, from one mental file and added to another (typically from a generic file to 
a particular)
As I mentioned previously, the primary sense of a word, I take it, is the content of the 
generic file and I also take it that the content of the generic file is the system of associated
commonplaces. For me, these are all the same thing, just discovered by different 
philosophers and given different names. 
I am going to illustrate how this definition can classify statements by going over 
three different kinds of metaphors. One where some aspect of the primary sense of a verb 
is carried over, another where some aspect of the primary sense of a noun is so carried, 
and a third, where the metaphor is seen after a preposition. Having this distinction is not 
only natural (well, as natural as the distinction between nouns and verbs), and it seems to 
cover most, if not all, possible metaphors.
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 4.4.1 Verb-Metaphors
Take a look at these two different metaphors: 
7. The girl floated onto the stage
8. The politician slithered to the podium
This statement, (7),  is a metaphor. It would almost be absurd to assert the 
contrary. By my account, it is a metaphor because some aspect(s) of the primary sense of 
the word 'float' has been brought over to the statement. The first step in figuring out the 
meaning of the metaphor would be to understand what the content of the FLOAT file is. 
Notice that this would be a mental file about an action. I think that we can and do have 
those. In much the same way as I can recognize a bird or a person or a bunny, I can 
recognize actions such as running. The primary sense of the word 'float,' I think, is 
'moving lightly' or 'drifting.' The proper use of the word 'float' concerns boats and other 
aquatic things; thus we have applied the concept of this kind of movement to the way she 
moved onto the stage. 
Metaphors where some aspect of the verb's primary sense is borrowed do not 
always concern the movement or actions of the subject. Sometimes they concern the 
subject herself. Take 8) 'the politician slithered to the podium.' The primary sense of the 
word 'slither' is the way a snake moves across the ground. But no one would say that the 
politician moved snake-like, rather they would say that the statement has the added 
meaning, beyond that the politician moved to the podium, that the politician is a snake 
(which is itself a metaphor).
 4.4.2 Noun-Metaphors 
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Now let's look at these two metaphors, which are slightly different in form from 
the ones we saw not moments ago.
9. He is an onion.
10. She is a big red bouncy ball.     
With metaphors where it's a noun which is carried over, we can look at the example (9). 
There are several different aspects of the primary sense of 'onion' which could be 
borrowed and applied to the subject; such as smelling bad or layered.44 But I assert that 
whatever interpretation is correct, it will have its roots in some aspect of the primary 
sense of the word 'onion.' 
(9) brings to mind an interesting point about these two types of metaphors. 
Metaphors where the sense is carried over from a verb, such as (7) and (8), have very few
ways that they could be applied to the subject/action. This is probably because the 
primary senses for these types of words is relatively small. Metaphors where the sense is 
carried over from a noun, however, seem to have more possible interpretations. For 
example, we could go with (10) The primary sense of 'big red bouncy ball' has many 
aspects to it; some of them are behavioral and others are iconic. 
This account has some exceptions. These are when a metaphor has become so 
common that the very meaning of the phrase or word has changed to match the 
interpretation (we call such metaphors “dead”). (7)-(10) are all novel metaphors, they are 
new or uncommon. Dead metaphors are those like 'she kicked the bucket,' 'time is 
running out,' or 'she fell in love.' The senses of these phrases no longer need to be carried 
44 You have to peel back the layers to get to know him.
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over. Their senses are within the file already.
 4.4.3 Preposition-Metaphors
Let's take the following two metaphors as examples of preposition-metaphors:
11. He ran into the fire.
12. She is on a cloud.
In these cases and others like it, we seem to require more knowledge about the situation 
than in the other cases. The object of the preposition is being referred to by a different 
name, much like how we can, and sometimes do, metaphorically refer to a person or a 
thing by the name of another. This is seen in Aristotle's examples of metaphors when 
Achilles is referred to with “the lion.” For (11) we need to know what the man was doing,
such as, maybe, he was running into a boardroom to give a presentation about the need to
spend more money in some department. The metaphor implied by (11), were that the 
case, would be that 11+) “the boardroom is a fire.” The same holds for (12). We need to 
know what the woman is doing to make further claims about the meaning of the 
metaphor. It may be the case that she is mattress shopping with her wife and she is 
currently laying on a mattress to test it out briefly . Were that the case, then we would get 
the metaphor 12+) “the mattress is a cloud.” Both of these implied metaphors reduce to 
the sorts of metaphors that were examined in  4.4.2. Whether or not the subjects of the 
implied metaphors were in fact the boardroom or the mattress doesn't really matter for the
purpose of general analysis. But what does matter is that in cases where the metaphoric 
expression is after a preposition, there is an implied noun-metaphor, which adds to the 
meaning of the expression as a whole.    
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 4.5 How Metaphors Function 
How metaphors function should be quite easy to see from the definition I gave. 
We understand metaphors by taking certain aspects of the primary sense of the alien or 
foreign word (determined by context) and applying them to the relevant part of the 
circumstance (be it the subject or the way the subject does/did something). The relevant 
part of the circumstance is determined by which aspect is carried. As we saw with (7), the
aspect carried over was the nature of the movement; so it was applied to the way the 
subject moved. With (8), the aspect was being a snake; so it was applied to the subject.
 4.6 Some Interesting Explanations
In this section, I will be giving some explanations for interesting phenomena, as I 
mentioned in chapter 1. The first is how certain, seemingly bland, metaphors can be 
found offensive. The second is actually my complaint against the Interaction account of 
metaphors. This was that it seems possible that we can learn things from metaphors, and 
this is not accounted for in the other theory. Due to the similarities between the two 
theories, mine and Black's, it seems best to show how mine overcomes the obstacle that 
trips the other theory. The third and final is to make explicit the fact that my theory 
entails a difference between metaphors and similes. 
 4.6.1 Offensive Metaphors
For this sub-subsection, I am going to be looking closely at two possibility 
offensive metaphors.45 For my purposes, it does not matter whether people actually find 
these offensive (though I have it on good authority that some do); I am merely showing 
45 I would like to thank Rachel Ades for these examples.
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how a person could find these offensive in some way. The first metaphor is:
13. He is blind to the truth
This metaphor is actually deeper than it seems. There are two possible ways that I can go 
about illustrating why a person might find this offensive. These two different ways 
illustrate two different possible routes of offense. For the first, if you would recall my 
discussion of generic files in this chapter,  4.3.1, I stated that this is seems reasonable and,
in some cases necessary for metaphors, that the mental files make reference to generic 
files. I think, in this case, a rather enlightening way of thinking about it is that here a 
generic file is making reference to another generic file. It seems clear that the BLIND file
contains the predicate “is unable to see.” The relevant predicate or property carried over 
from this file to the subject emphasizes an inability. A person who is blind probably does 
not want to be associated so clearly with an inability simpliciter. The second method 
follows a similar route as the previous, but we will go further into the predicate “is unable
to see.” This predicate makes reference, or so it would seem, to the SEE file. That file is 
probably more robust than the BLIND file. And, due to the very common metaphor 
associating seeing with understanding (such as “I see what you mean” or “I see the 
solution to the problem”), it is a very real possibility that people have in the SEE file 
some reference to UNDERSTAND. Thus, (13) would mean that he, the subject is unable 
to understand the truth. Having SEE so closely associated with UNDERSTAND would 
make members of the blind community offended because it is not the case that they are 
unable to understand a concept despite the fact that they lack the ability to see. 
The second metaphor which a person may find offensive follows a very similar 
30
process in understanding to the latter method seen above.  
14. Black is evil
This metaphor is, as before, deeper than it seems. This is a very common metaphor in our
culture, with the opposite, 'white is good' equally as common. Since the African-
American (Black) community commonly is called 'black,'46 having that color so closely 
associated with evil would almost make that a derogatory moniker. Calling a person 
'black' can, quite easily, carry with it the implication that they are evil; which, without 
much need for explanation, is quite offensive. 
Let's here look at how the Interaction account of metaphors would handle these 
sorts of metaphors. For (13), it could claim that the statement frames the subject in such a
way that the inability is emphasized, which may be offensive. But, since the system of 
commonplaces for blindness does not, at least to me, contain anything to do with 
understanding, there would be the missing chunk of meaning making it that they are 
unable to understand the truth. (So far as I have found, Black makes no claim about the 
relations between systems of associated commonplaces other than those used in his 
account of metaphor, which are remarkably different than the ones necessary to the 
understanding of this metaphor. Namely, there is no emphasizing of features in the 
relation between the blindness-system and the seeing-system). 
For (14), a similarly wrong reason for the offense would be given by Black's 
account. Like I mentioned before, the features would need to already be in the system to 
be emphasized. This means that calling people of  a dark skin-tone “black” and in the 
46 As I just did.
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system of commonplaces for “black” is “evil” would only be offensive, if contained in 
the system of commonplaces for that community was “evil” (which would thereby be 
able to be emphasized). A simpler way to solve this problem would not be to remove (14)
from common practice, but rather to disassociate the community from the notion of 
evilness. This would also serve to help the community in more ways than I could count.  
 4.6.2 Learning From Metaphors
As you may recall, my objection to the Interaction Account of Metaphor was that 
it could not account for the fact that people can learn something new from a metaphor. 
For example, a person could tell me that a girl I am about to meet is an owl. Since I know
very little about this person, it seems natural to say that some owl features are carried 
over, such as, big eyes or wise (in this case, probably big eyes and weird hair). In this 
case and others like it, it seems that, because my theory does not need many properties in 
the subject's file, only in the vehicle's file, we can learn things from metaphors.
 4.6.3 Metaphors V. Similes 
Previously, I have spoken about how I do not think that metaphors are the same as
similes, and later on, the next chapter, I will be giving evidence to support that 
conclusion. As I have stated many different ways and times, metaphors have one 
particularly relevant property/predicate copy-pasted from the vehicle to the subject; 
similes, on the other hand, to me, involve comparing the properties one the two files in 
questions in their entirety. Comparing the files in their entirety could and, I think, will 
make other properties/predicates become more salient and thereby result in differing 
interpretations of the words. 
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 4.6.4 A Potential Worry
Metaphors, it can be said, are always (or almost always) literally false. Some may 
claim that I have missed some phenomenological aspects of how we understand 
metaphors; namely that we first reject the semantic meaning of the statement and then we
try and figure out the speaker meaning. This distinction is found in Semantic Reference 
and Speaker Reference by Saul Kripke. Kripke writes, for example, that the distinction 
"between what the speaker's words meant on a given occasion, and what he meant, in 
saying those words."47 The game does save Kripke and others from some worries, saying 
that their theories are talking about the meaning of the words, not what the speaker 
meant. I could see a person, who I think is John, raking leafs, and then say to a friend 
“John is racking leafs.” But, as a matter of fact, that person is not John, but Bill. 
According to those who hold that there is such a thing as a semantic meaning/reference, I 
am referring to Bill, but my words are referring to John, and semantically my statement is
false.  
A quick point against the notion that metaphors are always literally false can be 
seen with the following example. Take the statements 'love is love' and 'it is what it is.' 
Both of these are literally, semantically, and necessarily true, but there is more meaning to
them than just some uninformative statement of fact. Applying my theory of metaphors to
them gives us that the vehicle and subject of the metaphors are the same, so when some 
relevant feature of the vehicle is carried over to the subject, it only serves to emphasize 
that feature, nothing is learned about it.48 'It is what it is' is commonly used to express the 
47 Kripke, pg. 13
48 This is much like the Interaction Account of Metaphors seen earlier.
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fact that whatever 'it' refers to can't be changed in the relevant context. So, if a person is 
trying to repair a car and failing to do so because the car is too far gone, another person 
may say 'it is what it is' to emphasize the fact that the alternator is broken. With 'love is 
love,' were it said by a daughter trying to convince her father to let her date some other 
person, it serves to emphasize the fact that love is worth striving for, or something like 
that.  
The worry here, I think, has little bearing on the way we use words. In everyday 
conversation, the semantic meaning and the pragmatic meaning may align a lot of the 
time, but what really matters is the pragmatic, or speaker, meaning. The meaning of a 
statement is its use, to quote Wittgenstein.49 In conversation, there may be two different 
ways of interpreting any given statement made by one of the parties therein, but the one 
taken away, the one understood by the hearer is the one which matters. The fact that both 
parties in a conversation understand each other and can proceed with the activity in which
they are engaged makes it less likely that the semantic meaning plays a very large role. In
my two counter examples to the claim about the semantic truth-value of metaphors, we 
have cases where the semantic meaning plays almost no role at all in the understanding or
the meaning of the statements, which supports my following point.
When it comes to metaphors, the pragmatic meaning is all that matters and having
an additional mental process to distinguish between the two does not fit with my 
phenomenological experience, nor does it fit with the brain scans of people given 
49 Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations, 43
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statements which require either semantic knowledge50 or world knowledge.5152 This 
objection to the point that I failed to account for a difference between metaphors and 
literal speech is, well, short but it is so because I only want to say that the distinction 
really does not matter in everyday conversational life. 
50 Statements relying solely on the semantic meaning of the words therein.
51 Statements relying on what the person knows or believes about the world, these are statements which 
rely on pragmatic meaning.
52 Hagoort, pg. 440
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Chapter 3: An Experimental Philosophy Study
 1. Introduction
As we saw previously, some philosophers have thought that metaphors are merely
abbreviated similes.  This study is to test whether there is, in fact, a difference in how 
people understand the two (namely, whether people will give different interpretation 
when prompted with a metaphor vs a simile).  
The Interpretation of Novel Metaphors by Bruce Fraser, published in 1979, had a 
structure very similar to this study. That study, however, was testing on how context 
determined the interpretations. The author did note that the subjects tended to give more 
responses concerning behavior when prompted with a simile than when prompted with a 
metaphor.53
 2. Hypothesis
Building on the note made by Fraser, the preliminary hypothesis of the present 
study is that similes and metaphors will tend to get different responses when participants 
are asked to interpret them. For example, the metaphor “he is a puppy” (not used in this 
study) will get responses like “he is cute” while the simile “he is like a puppy” will get 
responses like “he is playful.” Our secondary hypothesis is that similes will tend to get 
behavioral responses (i.e. responses concerning the behavior of the subject (how the 
subject acts)) while metaphors will tend to get iconic responses (i.e. responses concerning
the appearance of the subject (how the subject looks/smells)). Following the examples 
just given, a response of the form “he is cute” would count as iconic, whereas a response 
of the form “he is playful” would count as behavioral. 
53 Fraser, pg. 40
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As I stated previously in chapter 2  4.6.3, my account of metaphors does imply a 
difference between metaphors and similes. This is that when it comes to metaphors, we 
are looking for one, or very few, particularly salient features/predicates in one mental file 
and carrying it over to another mental file; whereas, with similes, we are engaged in a 
more comparative process taking the files as a whole to make our judgments about the 
meaning. I expect that when one is searching for one, or very few, features in a file, the 
salient features will different than the salient features when one is comparing the files as a
whole. For me, using the puppy-example, when I look for one, or very few, features in 
the file, iconic features are far more prominent; while when I look at the file as a whole, 
behavioral features become more prominent.  
 3. Procedure
The participants included in this study were 179 undergraduates between the ages 
of 18 and 40. There were 107 men and 72 women. All of the participants included in the 
study were self-described native English speakers. 15 participants not included in the 
study because they either described themselves as non-native English speakers (8), 
answered the same for all interpretations (5), answered incoherently (1), or described 
themselves as 16 years old (1).  Each participant was given a survey form consisting of 
15 metaphors or similes. Of these, 5 had animals as the object (e.g. “she is like a rhino”), 
5 had food items (e.g. “he is an onion”), and 5 had inanimate objects (e.g. “she is like a 
book”) (The metaphors and similes were procedurally generated from a data-bank of 60 
different objects (which will be further described in the results section)).  The participants
were given one of 16 possible forms. Each of these forms consisted  of either only 
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metaphors with a male as the subject (e.g. “he is an octopus”), only similes with a male as
the subject (e.g. “he is like an artichoke”), only metaphors with a female as the subject 
(e.g. “she is a star”), or only similes with a female as the subject (e.g. “she is like the 
sun”). Since all of the metaphors and the similes were generated from the same pool, 
there are four versions for each object/vehicle.54 
The participants were given metaphors and similes with different gendered 
subjects to test whether this would make a difference in the interpretations of the 
statements. If there is such a difference, it could be used to make the claim that the 
difference in metaphors and similes depends greatly on the subject to which they are 
applied, which may be intuitive to some people. 
 4. Results
After the data was collected, I had the sentences coded by 4 graduate philosophy 
students. The coders were sent the following email instructing them on how to code the 
data:
Hey, guys,
You each said that you would be my coders for the study. For the study, I had the 
participants interpret a set of sentences. Your job is to go through the 
interpretations and judge whether they concern the behavior of the subject ("she" 
or "he") or the their appearance. Behavioral responses will be like "she is playful,"
"he is jumpy," or "she is stoic." Iconic responses (responses concerning 
appearance) will be like "she smells bad," "he is fat," or "she is beautiful." If the 
participant just rephrased the prompt, left it blank, or wrote something like "no 
54 This makes 240 distinct sentences.
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meaning;" count that as a null response. All you need to do is put a 'B' next to the 
behavioral responses, an 'I' next to the iconic, and a 0 or 'N' next to the null 
responses. 
Some tricky ones will be responses like "she is tasty." 'Tasty' has two meanings, 
the first concerns having a pleasant taste while the other concerns being beautiful 
(appealing to the eye). "He is bright" has a similar issue. 'Bright' can mean 
"luminescent" or "smart." Since all of the sentences concern people, use your 
better judgement on responses with 2 or more possible meanings (such as, in my 
two examples, the latter make more sense). Responses concerning noises made by
the subject (e.g. "she is loud") are behavioral and responses concerning the 
hardness of the subject (e.g. "he is soft") are iconic (these were hard for me to 
decide on). 
I will be around, if you want to talk about it or have any questions.
The coders only ever received one of the four types of forms and they did not know my 
hypothesis. I will first present the raw numbers and then present the graphs derived from 
the data. In each of the subsections below, I will present also, side by side, the results 
from the he-statements (metaphors and similes with a male subject) and those from the 
she-statements (metaphors and similes with a female-subject). I will also give 6 different 
P-values through the use of a chi-square test. The P1-value is the value for he-statements 
treating the results from the metaphors as the expected and the results from the similes as 
the observed. The P2-value is the value for the he-statements where the roles of the 
results are reversed. The P3-value is the same as the P1-value, only where it is the results 
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from the she-statements; the same holds for the relation between the P4-values and the 
P2-value. The P5-value follows the same formulation as the P1-value, only taking the 
results of both the he-statements and she-statements. The P6-value also takes all of the 
results into account for the set of responses in question, but has the same formulation as 
the P2-value. I am taking a P-value to be statistical significant whenever it is below 0.05. 
 4.1 The Data and Graphs: Set 1 
For the first set of data I will present, I will give, side by side, the metaphors and 
similes with male ('he') subjects. Graph 1, seen below, shows the metaphors and similes 
with the following vehicles (the object of the sentence):
Set of Vehicles 1 (SoV1): Cake, onion, artichoke, carrot, banana, ball, gazelle, 
spider, octopus, cat, dog, sign, mirror, wall, and book.
The metaphors were interpreted by 11 participants, 6 male and 5 female. The similes 
were interpreted by 12 participants, 5 male and 7 female. The interpretations were coded 
by 2 male graduates students in philosophy. For the metaphors from this set, iconic 
responses appeared 14.5% of the time, behavioral showed up 73.4% of the time, and null 
responses came up 12.1% of the time. For the similes from this set, iconic responses 
showed up 20.43% of the time, behavioral came up 63.44% of the time, and null 
appeared 16.13% of the time.  Comparatively, iconic responses were approximately 6% 
more common for similes than for metaphors, behavioral were 10% more common for 
metaphors than similes, and null responses were  4% more common for similes than 
metaphors. The P1-value for this set is  0.0394, which is statistically significant. The P2-
value for this set is 0.0001, which is significant.  Both of these values support my primary
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hypothesis (that metaphors and similes will be statistically different), but the percentages 
do not support my secondary hypothesis (that iconic will be more common for 
metaphors).  
Now turning to the she-statements made from this set. The data from this set of 
vehicles  were all coded by a male and a female philosophy graduate students.  The 
metaphors were interpreted by 11 participants, 9 male and 2 female; while the similes 
were interpreted by the same number, but 5 male and 6 female.  For the metaphors, 
behavioral came up 60% of the time, null was at 22%, and iconic was at 18%. Similes 
had behavioral at 70%, null was at 11%, and iconic came in at 19%. This means that 
behavioral came up 10% more for similes, null came up 11% more for metaphors, and 
iconic came up 1% more for similes.  The P3-value of for this set is 0.0270, which is 
statistically significant. The P4-value for this set is 0.0019, which is significant. The 
values support my primary hypothesis, but do not support my secondary. They do support
the notion that metaphors will tend to get more null responses than similes. 
When we take the data from this set as a whole, the P5-value is 0.4620, which is 
not significant. The P6-value is equally bad with a value of 0.4823. If we remove the null 
responses from the equation, we get that metaphors got behavioral 81% of the time and 
iconic 19%; similes got behavioral 77% of the time and iconic 23% of the time. This 
means that metaphors got behavioral 4% of the time more than similes and similes got 
iconic 4% more of the time than metaphors; which goes against my secondary hypothesis
and generates an insignificant P-value. Comparing the results from the two, we get 
support for the notion that there is a difference in how people interpret statements with a 
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male subject and a female subject. This is because not only is there a difference in how 
statistically significant the results are, but also that the differences cancel each other out. 
This can be seen in how the sum of them does not make a significant result.  
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 1: SoV1 He-Metaphors
He is a book
He is a wall
He is a mirror
He is a sign
He is a dog
He is a cat
He is an octopus
He is a spider
He is a gazelle
He is a ball
He is a carrot
He is a banana
He is a artichoke 
He is an onion
He is a cake
Total
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Number of Iconic 
Responses
Number of Null 
Responses 
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
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 3: SoV1: She-Metaphors
She is a book
She is a wall
She is a mirror
She is a sign
She is a dog
She is a cat
She is an octopus
She is a spider
She is a gazelle
She is a ball
She is a carrot
She is a banana
She is a artichoke 
She is an onion
She is a cake
Total
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses 
Number of Null Responses
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
 2: SoV1: She-Similes
She is like a book
She is like a wall
She is like a mirror
She is like a sign
She is like a dog
She is like a cat
She is like an octopus
She is like a spider
She is like a gazelle
She is like a ball
She is like a carrot
She is like a banana
She is like a artichoke 
She is like an onion
She is like a cake
Total
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses 
Number of Null Responses
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
 4.2 The Data and Graphs: Set 2
Continuing with the 'he-metaphors' vs 'he-similes', graph 2, seen below consisted 
of the following vehicles:
SoV2: tall glass of water, potato, radish, hamburger, PB&J sandwich, raven, 
parrot, aardvark, elephant, rat, chair, table, star, sun, and moon.
The similes from this set were interpreted by 8 participants, 3 male and 5 female; 
while the metaphors were interpreted by 13 participants, 8 male and 5 female. These were
coded by the same coders as the last set. For the metaphors, behavioral responses were 
62.1% of the time, null were 21.2%, and iconic were 16.7%. For the similes, behavioral 
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 4: SoV1: He-Similes
He is like a book
He is like a wall
He is like a mirror
He is like a sign
He is like a dog
He is like a cat
He is like an octopus
He is like a spider
He is like a gazelle
He is like a ball
He is like a carrot
He is like a banana
He is like a artichoke 
He is like an onion
He is like a cake
Total
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses 
Number of Null Responses
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
responses were 69.6% of the time, null were 5.6%, and iconic were 24.8%. Behavioral 
responses were 7.5% more common for similes, null responses were 15.6% more 
common for metaphors, and iconic responses were 8.1% more common for similes. 
Running a chi-square test, as I did before, gives us a P1-value of 0.0002, which is 
significant; the P2-value is 0.0001, which is also significant.  These values also support 
my primary hypothesis, but they do not support either that metaphors tend to get more 
iconic responses or that similes will tend to get more iconic. It did support, however, that 
metaphors would get more null responses. This may be because when a person is looking 
for a singular feature in the files associated with these vehicles, they tend to fail; but 
when they are looking at the file as a whole, they tend to succeed.  
The she-metaphors were interpreted by 10 participants, 5 male and 5 female; the 
she-similes were interpreted by 11 participants, 5 male and 6 female. For the similes, 
behavioral responses were at 57%, null responses were at 12%, and iconic responses 
were at 31%. Metaphors had behavioral at  65%, null at 7%, and iconic at 28%. This 
means that behavioral responses were 8% more for metaphors, null responses were 5% 
more for similes, and iconic responses were 3% more for similes. The P3-value for this 
set is 0.0873, which is close, but not quite statistically significant.  The P4-value for this 
set is 0.1193, which is far from significant. The values and percentages do not support 
either my primary hypothesis or my secondary, though, the difference in percentages, 
however small, does support the notion that similes will tend to receive iconic responses 
over metaphors.
Taking them all together, we get that metaphors got behavioral 63% of the time, 
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null 15% of the time, and iconic 22% of the time. Similes had behavioral at 62%, null at 
9%, and iconic at 29%. This means that metaphors got behavioral 1% more, null 6% 
more, and iconic 7% less. The P5-value is  0.0981, which is not significant, and the P6-
value is 0.0576, which is, also, not significant. These values do not support my primary 
hypothesis, though they do weakly support the notion that similes will tend to receive 
more iconic responses than metaphors.  
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 5: SoV2: He-Metaphors
He is the moon
He is the sun
He is a star
He is a table
He is a chair
He is a rat 
He is an elephant
He is an aardvark 
He is a parrot
He is a raven
He is a PB&J sandwich
He is a hamburger
He is a radish
He is a potato
He is a tall glass of water
Total
0% 50% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses
Number of Null Responses 
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
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 7: SoV2: He-Similes
He is like the moon
He is like the sun
He is like a star
He is like a table
He is like a chair
He is like a rat 
He is like an elephant
He is like an aardvark 
He is like a parrot
He is like a raven
He is like a PB&J sandwich
He is like a hamburger
He is like a radish
He is like a potato
He is like a tall glass of water
Total
0% 50% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses 
Number of Null Responses
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
 6: SoV2: She-Metaphors
She is the moon
She is the sun
She is a star
She is a table
She is a chair
She is a rat 
She is an elephant
She is an aardvark 
She is a parrot
She is a raven
She is a PB&J sandwich
She is a hamburger
She is a radish
She is a potato
She is a tall glass of water
Total
0% 50% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses 
Number of Null Responses
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
 4.3 The Data and Graphs: Set 3
The next set of data is from the same strain, seen in graph 3, it consisted of the 
following vehicles:
SoV3: chicken soup, glass of wine, beer, Thai curry, pizza, worm, turkey, chicken,
rooster, lamb, lamp, encyclopedia, rug, trash bin, and statue
These were coded by the same coders as before. The similes were interpreted by 11 
participants, 6 male and 5 female; while the metaphors were interpreted by 10 
participants, 9 male and 1 female. For the metaphors, I had behavioral at 62%, null at 
21%, and iconic at 17%. In the case of similes, I had behavioral at 75%, null at 3%, and 
iconic at 22%. This means that similes had 13% more behavioral responses, metaphors 
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 8: SoV2: She-Similes
She is like the moon
She is like the sun
She is like a star
She is like a table
She is like a chair
She is like a rat 
She is like an elephant
She is like an aardvark 
She is like a parrot
She is like a raven
She is like a PB&J sandwich
She is like a hamburger
She is like a radish
She is like a potato
She is like a tall glass of water
Total
0% 50% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses 
Number of Null Responses
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
had 18% more null responses, and similes had 5% more iconic responses. Doing the same
process as before, we get a P1-value of 0.0001, which is statistically significant; the P2-
value is 0.0001. Again, these values support my primary hypothesis; but also the 
percentages fail to support the secondary. Again, we see that metaphors tended to get 
more null responses, which is in line with the potential explanation I gave in the previous 
section.  
 The she-metaphors here were interpreted by 12 participants, 6 male and 6 female;
with the she-similes interpreted by 13 participants, 7 male and 6 female. For metaphors, 
behavioral responses came up 67% of the time, null came up 22%, and iconic was at 
11%. Similes had behavioral at 75%, null at 12%, and iconic at 13%. This means that 
similes had 8% more behavioral, metaphors had 10% more null, and similes had 2% 
more iconic. The P3-value for this is 0.0533, which is close to being statistically 
significant, but not quite. The P4-value for this set is 0.0278, which is significant. The 
P4-value does support my primary hypothesis, while the P3-value, on its own, does not. 
The percentages do not support my secondary hypothesis, as is becoming the trend with 
the she-statements, but they do support the notion that metaphors will tend to get more 
null responses than similes. 
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Taking this set all together, we get that metaphors have 61% behavioral, 22% null,
and 17% iconic. Similes have 75% behavioral, 8% null, and 17% iconic. This means that 
metaphors got 14% less behavioral responses and 14% more null responses. The P5-
value for this set is 0.0023, which is significant and the P6-value for this set is 0.0001, 
which is also significant. These P-values support my primary hypothesis, but the 
secondary hypothesis is not supported. We do have even further support for the notion 
that metaphors will tend to receive more null responses than similes, however.
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 9: SoV3: He-Metaphors
He is a statue
He is a trash bin
He is a rug
He is an encyclopedia
He is a lamp
He is a lamb
He is a rooster
He is a chicken
He is a turkey
He is a worm
He is a pizza
He is a Thai curry
He is a beer
He is a glass of wine
He is  chicken soup
Total
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses
Number of Null Responses 
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
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 11: SoV3: She-Metaphors
She is a statue
She is a trash bin
She is a rug
She is an encyclopedia
She is a lamp
She is a lamb
She is a rooster
She is a chicken
She is a turkey
She is a worm
She is a pizza
She is a Thai curry
She is a beer
She is a glass of wine
She is  chicken soup
Total
0% 50% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses 
Number of Null Responses
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
 10: SoV3: He-Similes
He is like a statue
He is like a trash bin
He is like a rug
He is like an encyclopedia
He is like a lamp
He is like a lamb
He is like a rooster
He is like a chicken
He is like a turkey
He is like a worm
He is like a pizza
He is like a Thai curry
He is like a beer
He is like a glass of wine
He is like  chicken soup
Total
0% 50% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses 
Number of Null Responses
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
    
 4.4 The Data and Graphs: Set 4
The next set of data, seen in graph 4, was coded by the same coders as before. The
similes were interpreted by 11 participants, 7 male 4 female; while the metaphors were 
interpreted by the same number but consisting of 9 males and 2 females. The set of 
vehicles used are seen below:
SoV4: whiskey, candy, fennel, pho, hot wings, rhino, meerkat, marmot, lion, 
cheetah, violin, trombone, piano, theater, fountain.
For the metaphors, behavioral responses were 81% of the time, null were 8%, and 
iconic were 11%. For the similes, behavioral responses were 59% of the time, null were 
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 12: SoV3: She-Similes
She is like a statue
She is like a trash bin
She is like a rug
She is like an encyclopedia
She is like a lamp
She is like a lamb
She is like a rooster
She is like a chicken
She is like a turkey
She is like a worm
She is like a pizza
She is like a Thai curry
She is like a beer
She is like a glass of wine
She is like  chicken soup
Total
0% 50% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses 
Number of Null Responses
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
25%, and iconic were 16%. Behavioral responses were 22% more common for 
metaphors, null responses were 17% more common for similes, and iconic responses 
were 5% more common for similes. Running a chi-square test, as I did before, gives us a 
P-value of 0.0001, which is extremely significant, the P2-value is 0.0001. These values, 
yet again, support the conclusion that there is a difference between metaphors and 
similes. These numbers do not fall in line the idea that when one is searching for a 
particular feature, rather than looking at the file as a whole, they tend to fail. More nulls 
were for similes in this case. But what we did get is support for the idea that similes tend 
to get iconic responses more often than metaphors, which the opposite of my secondary 
hypothesis.
The she-metaphors were interpreted by 12 participants, 8 male and 4 female. The 
she-similes were done by the same number of participants, but with 9 male and 3 female. 
The results were, for metaphors, 67% of the responses were behavioral, 14% were null, 
and 19% were iconic. With similes,  66% of the responses were behavioral, 18% were 
null, and 16% were iconic. This means that metaphors had 1% more behavioral, similes 
had 4% more null, and metaphors had 3% more iconic. The P3-value for this was 0.4423,
which is not statistically significant. The P4-value for this set is 0.4203, which is not 
significant. These values do not support my primary hypothesis, but they do not line up 
with any of the previous sets of data. These percentages support a previously unsupported
claim that similes will receive more null responses than metaphors. Maybe, in prompting 
the participants with a female-subject, for these vehicles, all of the features in their files 
were equally salient (similes), or there were many competing for 'first place', making the 
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participants chose not to answer. While with metaphors, in looking for one, or very few, 
salient features, the participants were readily able to respond intelligibly.
For this set, overall, metaphors were 74% behavioral, 11% null, and 15% iconic; 
similes were 63% behavioral, 21% null, and 16% iconic. Thus, metaphors had 11% more 
behavioral, 10% less null, and 1% less iconic. The P5-value for this is 0.0045 
(significant) and the P6-value is 0.0343 (significant). The values support my primary 
hypothesis, but the percentages do not support my secondary hypothesis. They support 
the notion that similes will tend to receive more iconic responses, and that metaphors will
tend to receive more behavioral responses.  
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 13: SoV4: She-Metaphors
She is a fountain
She is a theater
She is a piano
She is a trombone
She is a violin
She is a cheetah
She is a lion
She is a marmot
She is a meerkat
She is a rhino
She is hot wings
She is pho
She is fennel
She is candy
She is whiskey
Total
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses 
Number of Null Responses
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
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 14: SoV4: He-Metaphors
He is a fountain
He is a theater
He is a piano
He is a trombone
He is a violin
He is a cheetah
He is a lion
He is a marmot
He is a meerkat
He is a rhino
He is hot wings
He is pho
He is fennel
He is candy
He is whiskey
Total
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses
Number of Null Responses 
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
15: SoV4: He-Similes
He is like a fountain
He is like a theater
He is like a piano
He is like a trombone
He is like a violin
He is like a cheetah
He is like a lion
He is like a marmot
He is like a meerkat
He is like a rhino
He is like hot wings
He is like pho
He is like fennel
He is like candy
He is like whiskey
Total
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses 
Number of Null Responses
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
 4.5 The Data and Graphs: Set 5
Now, comparing them overall, I had a total of 45 participants interpreting the he-
metaphors, with 32 male and 13 female; and I had 42 participants interpreting the he-
similes, with 21 male and 21 female. For the metaphors, behavioral responses came up 
74% of the time, null response appeared 13% of the time, and iconic responses came up 
13% of the time. For similes, behavioral response showed up 67% of the time, null 
responses came up 13% of the time, and iconic was at 20% of the time. This means that 
behavioral responses came up 7% of the time more often for metaphors, null was at the 
same occurrence level, and iconic appeared 7% more often for similes. Running the chi-
square test as before, we get a P1-value of  0.1091, which is not considered to be 
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 16: SoV4: She-Similes
She is like a fountain
She is like a theater
She is like a piano
She is like a trombone
She is like a violin
She is like a cheetah
She is like a lion
She is like a marmot
She is like a meerkat
She is like a rhino
She is like hot wings
She is like pho
She is like fennel
She is like candy
She is like whiskey
Total
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Number of Iconic Responses 
Number of Null Responses
Number of Behavioral 
Responses 
statistically significant, and a P2-value of  0.2038, which is also not significant. This is 
despite the fact that over all, thus far, metaphors had behavioral responses 7% more than 
similes and similes had iconic 7% more than metaphors. Taking this into account,  if we 
do not include the null responses, we get that for metaphors, behavioral came up 85% of 
the time and iconic came up 15% of the time; while with similes, we get that behavioral 
appeared 76% of the time and iconic was at 24%. This does give us a statistically relevant
P1-value of 0.0117. The P2-value for this, including null responses, is 0.2038, without the
null responses, we get a P2-value of 0.0351. 
These values, if we do not include the null responses, support my primary 
hypothesis, but the percentages, just like when we looked at the sets individually, do not 
support my secondary hypothesis. They also do not support the idea that metaphors will 
tend to receive more null responses, as both metaphors and similes got the same 
percentage of those. The percentages do support the idea that similes will tend to receive 
more iconic responses than metaphors. This can be explained by saying that when a 
person is looking for one, or very few, (metaphors) salient features in a file, the 
behavioral features are more readily available; while when a person is looking at all of 
the content of a file (similes), the most noticeable features are iconic: or, at least, tend to 
be.
Now it is time to compare all of the sets of she-metaphors and she-similes 
together. The metaphors were interpreted by 45 participants, 28 male and 17 female. The 
similes were interpreted by 47 participants, 26 male and 21 female. The response for the 
metaphors were 65% behavioral, 17% null and 18% iconic. The similes had 67% 
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behavioral, 13% null, and 20% iconic. This means that similes got 2% more behavioral, 
metaphors got 4% more null, and similes got 2% more iconic. The P3-value is 0.5420 
which is not statistically significant. The P4-value for the overall she-statements is 
0.4746, which is not significant. As before, if we remove the null responses,  we get that 
metaphors has behavioral responses 78% of the time and iconic 22% of the time; while 
with similes, we get the same. Which is not going to be a statistically relevant difference 
(value of 1). The values do not support my primary hypothesis, but the very small 
difference in values lend a very small amount of support to the notion that metaphors will
tend to get more null responses, as seen in some of the sets of responses. Since these 
results differ from the he-statements, we could point to either that prompting with a 
female-subject results in the participants searching for relevant features which differ from
those they search for with he-metaphors and failing; while they succeed when they take 
the files as a whole. 
Now, if we take the total over all, combining the responses from he-metaphors 
with she-metaphors and the responses from he-similes with those from she-similes we get
what is seen in the graph below. The metaphors were interpreted by 90 participants, 60 
male and 30 female, and the similes were interpreted by 89 participants, 47 male and 42 
female. The metaphors got 69% behavioral,  15% null, and 16% iconic. The similes got 
67% behavioral,  13% null, and 20% iconic. Breaking this down, we got behavioral 2% 
more often for metaphors, null 2% more often for metaphors and iconic 4% more for 
similes. The P5-value for this over all is 0.5157, which is not statistically significant. The 
P6-value is 0.6260, which is not significant. 
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If we remove the null values, we get that metaphors got behavioral responses 81%
of the time and iconic responses 19% of the time; similes got behavioral responses 77% 
of the time and iconic 23% of the time.  Meaning that metaphors got behavioral 4% more 
often and similes for iconic more often by the same percent.  This gives us a P5-value of 
0.3079 and a P6-value of 0.3418, neither of which are significant. These values do not 
support my primary hypothesis, mostly because of the strong difference between the 
responses for he-statements and she-statements; the latter basically cancels out the 
difference in interpretation seen in for the he-statements. The percentages, however, 
support the notion that similes tend to receive iconic responses over metaphors; which, as
I have mentioned before, is the opposite of my hypothesis.
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 17: He-Statements Overall
He-Metaphors vs He-Similes
Iconic Responses (Metaphor)
Behavioral Responses 
(Metaphor)
Null Responses (Metaphor)
Iconic Responses (Simile)
Behavioral Responses 
(Simile)
Null Responses (Simile)
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 18: She-Statements Overall
She-Metaphors vs She-Similes
Iconic Responses 
(Metaphor)
Behavioral Responses 
(Metaphor)
Null Responses (Metaphor)
Iconic Responses (Simile)
Behavioral Responses 
(Simile)
Null Responses (Simile)
 19: The Statements Overall
Metaphors vs Similes Overall
Iconic Responses (Metaphor)
Behavioral Responses 
(Metaphor)
Null Responses (Metaphor)
Iconic Responses (Simile)
Behavioral Responses 
(Simile)
Null Responses (Simile)
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 20: Comparing Metaphors and Similes for Iconicity
Metaphors vs Similes (Iconic)
Iconic Responses 
(Metaphor)
Iconic Responses (Simile)
 21: Comparing Metaphors and Similes for Behavioral Responses
Metaphors vs Similes (Behavioral)
Behavioral Responses 
(Metaphor)
Behavioral Responses 
(Simile)
 5 Discussion
In this section, I plan to give my interpretation of the data presented in the last 
section. As you may recall, I started this project with two hypotheses. The first was that 
there will be a statistically relevant difference between the interpretations of metaphors 
and similes; thereby concluding that metaphors are not abbreviated similes, as Aristotle's 
theory, and others like it, would claim. The second hypothesis was that metaphors will 
tend to receive iconic responses more often than similes. This claim is based on my own 
way of thinking, which is highly pictorial when it comes to metaphors.   
In the case of the he-statements, I certainly have support for the primary 
hypothesis. In the overall analysis, as well as the individual analyses, I consistently got 
statistically relevant differences. These differences give support, thereby, for the 
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 22: Comparing Metaphors and Similes for Null Responses
Metaphor vs Simile (Null)
Null Responses (Metaphor)
Null Responses (Simile)
conclusion that metaphors are not abbreviated similes. For the she-statements, however, 
there was the interesting result that there was only a statistically relevant difference 
between metaphors and similes once. Overall, when we remove the null responses 
actually resulted in a P-value  of 1, this the least statistical difference possible. Having a 
P-value of 1 for the she-statements basically canceled out the relevant differences in the 
he-statements, making the overall difference not statistically significant. 
When it comes to my secondary hypothesis. I did not see that metaphors received 
iconic responses more often than similes for the he-statements. But rather, the opposite 
came out as supported. It would seem that given the results from this survey, similes tend 
to receive more iconic responses than metaphors. These results fall in line with another 
study, by Ravid A. Aisenman published in 1999. In that study, the participants were given
sets of words and ask to choose whether it was more natural to have “is” or “is like” in 
between them. The author's results there supported the claim that metaphors and similes 
are not the same thing (what is called there the “nonequivalence view”).55 These results, 
however, should be taken with a grain of salt, despite aligning with my view that they are 
not the same thing. This is  because another study, published that same year, concerning 
the recall of metaphors and similes cross-culturally (Spanish monolinguals and English 
monolinguals) showed that there is some production bias within a linguistic community 
(some cultures will prefer metaphors over similes, even for the same set of objects).56 For 
the she-statements, it can only be said, rather tenuously, that metaphors receive null 
responses more often than similes, and similes receive both iconic and behavioral 
55 Aisenman, pg. 50
56 Harris, pg. 7
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responses more often. But this difference is not statistically significant. 
In the following subsection, I will go over way in which my study may have gone 
wrong. These include the lack of context and the possible variance in context. After that, I
will move on to an explanation of why I think there was such a great difference in the 
interpretations of the he-statements vs. the she-statements. One way of handling the 
difference is to say that in English, 'he' is commonly used as a generic singular person, 
rather than a pronoun for a particular male. Another reason that there may be difference 
could be that people use different cognitive processes for interpreting statements with 
male-subjects and female-subjects.  Finally, I will move on to how my theory of 
metaphors allows for the difference seen in the he-statements.
 5.1 Ways the Study may have Gone Wrong
As I mentioned above, I can think of two ways that the study may have gone 
wrong. The first is that there was a lack of context. Some may, rightly, claim that the 
meaning of a metaphor, or any speech is highly dependent on the context of the utterance.
To reuse an example I gave previously, take the statement 'love is love.' If we take that 
statement without any context whatsoever, we would get that it is necessarily true and 
very uninformative. But if the statement is made in a context where a person is hopelessly
infatuated with a person who is dead-wrong for them, the statement 'love is love' would 
have some meaning would be informative in some sense (namely, 'love is irrational' or 
something like that). If, however, the statement is seen on a protest sign in favor of 
homosexual marriage, then the statement would have a radically different meaning (such 
as 'love is irrespective of gender' or 'love is good'). The core issue with my study which 
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some may claim is that the wild differences and similarities between metaphors and 
similes can't be taken at  face value, because without context, there aren't reliable results.
The other issue that some may claim against my study is that I did not control for 
a context. The participants may have, easily, thought of a person that they knew and 
applied the metaphors to them, or they treated it as a generic, as we will see below. If the 
participants applied the metaphors or similes to a person that they knew, the results may 
be different because what they take to be possible of that subject is different. We can 
easily imagine that a participant took 'he' to be referring to an ex-lover, and in that case, 
how they take the metaphors or similes would be different than how they would take 
them were 'he' in reference to their father.   
  5.2 Reasons for Difference
As I mentioned above, I think that one of the reasons that the metaphors and 
similes in the she-statements do not seem to have a statistical difference is in virtue of the
fact that 'he' is commonly used as a generic. For example, although there has been a trend
to change this, when a philosopher is setting up a thought experiment, she may not have 
specified the gender the subject therein, but the default is to use 'he.'57 If the participants 
in the study have a similar habit, then what we are looking at is what the participants take
to be relevant to build up information about some generic person, not a particular. With 
the she-statements, 'she' is not treated as some generic for a person, but as a particular 
pronoun referring to a person. In that case, what the participants look for as relevant to 
the person would be rather different.
57 When writing that sentence, I noticed that I needed to pay special attention not to use 'he' and go with 
'she.' Seeing 'she' in a thought experiment where the gender of the subject is unspecified catches many 
off guard.
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Another possible reason, saying that 'he' as a generic pronoun is not relevant here, 
is that people think about women differently than they think about men. This is akin to 
the explanations seen in several of the sub-subsections concerning the she-statements. It 
may be the case that the prompting with the gender resulted in a different way of 
interpreting the statements. The features which are salient when a person is looking for 
one, or very few, feature(s) for a male-subject are different than the salient feature(s) one 
would find when looking for a female-subject.  This different way of thinking about the 
statement will elicit different sorts of responses; which, just by coincidence, metaphors 
and similes are interpreted similarly. This way of explaining the difference does not help 
the similes account of metaphors because the examples used by the supporters involve 
male-subjects; which does not illicit similar responses.
  5.3 How My Theory Handles The Difference
Just merely looking at the he-statements, I have a strong difference. As I 
mentioned in chapter 2  4.6.3 of this thesis, my theory can handle and my even imply a 
difference between the two. My explanation for the difference is that with similes, since 
the mental files are compared in their entirety, the salient features tend to be more iconic, 
whereas since with metaphors, the hearer is only looking for one, or very few, 
particularly relevant feature(s), the salient features tend to be behavioral. This explanation
would work either way. We can suppose that were my secondary hypothesis correct, I 
would claim that the salient features elicited by the statements are flipped. This does not, 
however, make my theory unfalsifiable. The falsifying condition for the theory would be 
that there is no difference between the two. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
I started this thesis with a rather robust metaphor that philosophy is cartography. 
Different theories are different maps used to represent the world, or different aspects of it.
Maps which fail to represent the world in the right way are bad maps; philosophical 
theories which do the same are equally bad. I ventured into an area seldom mapped; hic 
sunt dracones. First, I compared different maps of tropology to see which one made the 
most sense given my knowledge of the region. These maps failed in different respects, 
but some of the core notions were accurate, at least in the case of the Interaction Account 
of Metaphors. Noticing this, I took it upon myself to draw out a new map of the region, 
first from the armchair, taking the claims of Cicero, Austin, and Ricanati; and then 
venturing forth into the region through the use of experimental philosophy. My map can 
account for the phenomena seen in the study and for  phenomena found elsewhere in the 
realm of tropology. 
An open question is the relation between metaphors and literal speech given my 
theory. Since, for reasons outside of the scope of this thesis, I hold that there is no hard-
line between metaphors and literal speech (there is no great ocean or river dividing these 
regions), my theory needs to explain why, in a vagueness-friendly way, there is a seeming
difference. One possible way of accounting for this is that the amount of salient features 
which may be carried over from the vehicle (or object of the sentence) to the subject in 
literal speech is very high, if not all of the features, whereas with metaphors, the number 
of salient features which may be carried over are not quite as high. With 'philosophy is 
cartography' while the number of salient features is low, the number of possibly correct 
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features that one may carry over is quite high, but since the set of these features does not 
encompass all of the features in the CARTOGRAPHY file, we still call this a metaphor. 
In the same way, if we were to analyze the statement “geometry is math,” people would 
assent to this being literal because all of the features in the MATH file are applicable to 
the GEOMETRY file, but not necessarily the other way around. Further testing and 
exploration in tropology is needed to get a truly accurate map. It is accurate to say that 
the region is beautiful and dragon-less.
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